Shipmates,
I am republishing this post with the following comments.
First of all, thank you for commenting. We understand there are many views and some concerns regarding modernization. I also assume the first two commentors are both active duty members of a Chiefs Mess. We need to hear from the Chiefs and, more importantly, we need them to be involved in this important effort. That is the reason I addressed both the CPOA Convention and the Reserve Chiefs Call earlier this year.
I also thank you for stating up front "the question isn't why modernize." I agree the case is clear and the cause for action compelling.
Let's discuss the concerns raised.
The first time I heard the phrase "we're simply not ready" was in 1986 when I was briefing the recommendations of the Gilbert Study to flag officers in the Coast Guard. As noted by Admiral Gilbert in his article that was the reason we didn’t consolidate our financial management system and the reason we are still not ready to pass an audit.
Perceived readiness for change does not change the requirement to change. I announced the need for modernization the day I became Commandant, two and a half years ago. I also told the Service that we would take several years to implement the changes so we could align billet changes with the military assignment process and provide proper notification and consultation with our civilian workforce and unions. We have done that and will continue.
The need for modernization exists independent of whatever resource levels we are provided. Let me be clear on this. It would not matter whether we were experiencing exponential growth, no growth, or downsizing. Our business processes and command and control structure do not support mission execution in any funding environment. Regardless of your salary, you need to be able to balance the checkbook.
Fund base transfers associated with organizational change are difficult and made more difficult by the lack of a core financial accounting system. In 1987, we had to separate cutter maintenance funds which were managed at the district and centralize them at the Maintenance and Logistics Commands. However, for many years districts had moved funding back and forth between cutter support and small boat support (between what is now AFC 30 and the 4X accounts) and it wasn’t clear what the right level of basic support for each really was. We did the best we could but it was surgery with a meat cleaver. The major obstacle?...the lack of reliable financial information on the costs to operate our small boats and cutters. How do I know this? I was the first budget officer at MLCLANT and I was responsible for identifying and recommending the levels of fund base transfers.
Regarding access to support, we intend to create one stop shopping through product line or service line managers at our logistics and service centers. Questions regarding maintenance on small boats, configuration on cutters, TRICARE access, employee assistance programs, or government vehicles will be referred to a single point of contact and accountability in the Coast Guard. The implementation planning for this new business model is underway and in some cases, like HEC maintenance and small boat maintenance, we have accelerated the process.
Regarding the impact on the Chiefs Mess, I will ask Master Chief Bowen to provide comments in a subsequent post. I have been involved in Chiefs Call to Initiation and Indoctrination and the "predecessor activities" for nearly 40 years. The Chiefs Mess at a particular unit provides critical leadership and is indispensable. However, when I think about the "Chiefs Mess" I tend to think in broader, symbolic terms. I think of the cohesion chiefs bring to our Service. I think of the critical role Chiefs play in translating command intent into action. I think of my Dad. Chiefs are not divided by organizational charts. They are united by commonly held values and the critical role they play in mission support and mission execution. They are indispensable.
ADM A
The original post follows:
Our current modernization effort seeks to address a number of mission execution and mission support challenges, including the Deepwater program, the current condition of our surface fleet, our financial management system, and recent changes in our human resource system. These are all products of a multi-decade challenge to maintain and recapitalize our assets and adapt our workforce to changes in mission demands in a constrained fiscal environment. This is the first in a series of posts that chronicle how our need to modernize evolved and why I have made it the centerpiece of my tenure as Commandant. The end goal is to better integrate internal Coast Guard structure and business processes to meet the increasingly complex demands of the 21st Century.
This attachment was written by RADM Marshall Gilbert, director of the Gilbert Study, which resulted in the Coast Guard's major realignment in 1987. It is a good datum from which to begin a discussion of the current and desired future state of our mission support systems. /GilbertStudy.PDF
Consider the Coast Guard in 1986:
· Area Commanders controlled no assets.
· Districts owned large cutters homeported in their Area of Responsibility.
· All naval, civil, and electronics engineering support functions were located in districts.
· Districts were stand-alone financial entities...financial systems were not networked. There was no unified general ledger from which to create financial statements.
· Personnel and pay transactions were carried out at the unit and district level.
· E-City (ARSC) and the CG Yard were, and remain, stand alone financial centers dealing directly with treasury.
After the realignment of 1987:
· Major cutters were placed under the control of Area Commanders.
· Districts retained control of buoy tenders and patrol boats.
· Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLC) were established (one for each area). Naval, civil and electronics engineering were consolidated on each coast, but not centralized.
· Financial accounting, contracting, and bill paying consolidated at each MLC with the exception of ARSC, the Yard, and payroll. This was immediately understood to be a mistake and a short time later our Finance Center (FINCEN) was created.
· Personnel and pay moved to Pay and Personnel Center but separate from FINCEN
· E-City (ARSC) and CG Yard still stand alone financial entities.
The Gilbert Study (I was the junior member as a Lieutenant Commander) was the starting part of our current cause for action to modernize. Even at the time of this reorganization we knew that it was not THE fix, but it was an improvement. In his own words, Admiral Gilbert said, "Early in our study we concluded that the Coast Guard's accounting functions cannot be regionalized or centralized at this time."
Two decades ago these changes were seen as revolutionary by the Service and the change was hard because of our evolved culture of independence by field commanders and the perception that only they could make effective decisions regarding mission support. We had just fielded the standard Coast Guard Work Station based on a proprietary operating system. Our IT systems remained largely stove piped and it would not be until the mid 1990's, (another decade) before we would move to a more open architecture and openly compete our workstation contract. In those two decades a number of independent reforms have been started, stopped, and in some cases started again. In each case, there was well-meaning intent, but limited integration, and thus limited progress. We will discuss these more in our next installment...
